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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2004 the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Chaoulli v. 
Quebec (Attorney General)1 and Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General).2 At issue in Chaoulli was the constitu-
tionality of legal restrictions on the private provision of health care; at 
issue in Auton was the constitutionality of British Columbia’s decision 
not to fund a specific treatment for autism within its public health care 
system. Chaoulli and Auton are the most visible manifestations of an 
increasingly common phenomenon: the use of rights-based litigation as 
an instrument of health care policy reform.3 Among the key issues that 
have already been litigated under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
are physician supply management, medical practice regulation, hospital 
restructuring, and the regulation and provision of specific treatment and 
services. Prior to 2004, the Supreme Court’s contribution to this phe-
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nomenon included nullifying the federal abortion law, modifying  
professional advertising regulations, upholding the criminal prohibition 
against assisted suicide, and establishing a constitutional right to sign 
language interpretation in the provision of health care services.4 
With the exception of Morgentaler, which established an entirely 
new abortion regime that depends crucially on the widespread use of 
private clinics,5 the Supreme Court’s health care decisions have operated 
largely at the periphery of this policy field. Chaoulli and Auton are dif-
ferent. The first potentially challenges the very existence of publicly 
funded health care, and the second challenges the plenary authority of 
provincial governments to determine the scope of their public health 
care systems. The cases thus speak to core questions about the organiza-
tion and implementation of health care policy, as well as to the judicial 
process’s institutional decision making capacity. 
The cases also speak to broader questions about a cluster of related 
phenomena that falls under the rubric of “legal mobilization.” These 
phenomena include the “process by which legal norms are invoked to 
regulate behavior;”6 the translation of desires into demands through “an 
assertion of one’s rights;”7 and a “planned effort to influence the course 
of judicial policy development to achieve a particular policy goal.”8 As a 
strategy for policy reform, legal mobilization ideally aims at establish-
ing new legal rules that generate desirable policy consequences and 
strengthen the political position of the reform’s advocates. Reality, 
however, is usually more complicated. Legal mobilization may fail to 
establish sought-for legal rule changes, yet desirable policy consequenc-
es may follow; desirable rules may emerge from litigation, but have no 
impact on policy or social conditions; unsuccessful legal mobilization 
may nevertheless strengthen a policy reform movement by energizing 
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individuals around particular causes; by contrast, successful mobiliza-
tion may enervate a movement or energize a counter-movement. 
Chaoulli and Auton are interesting examples of legal mobilization 
for several reasons. First, health care is arguably the single most im-
portant area of Canadian public policy: it consumes almost 10 per cent 
of GDP and is the largest single expenditure item in provincial budgets. 
Second, the cases offer differing visions of the direction health policy 
should take: Chaoulli seeks to expand private provision while Auton 
seeks to expand public coverage. Finally, one case involves an individu-
al lone crusader (Chaoulli), and the other a group with roots in an orga-
nized social movement (Auton). Consequently, both cases provide a 
good empirical base for exploring three key questions about legal mobi-
lization: How do cases such as these get into the judicial system? Under 
what conditions are such claims likely to be successful? What is the 
impact of winning — or losing — on the broader policy environment? 
By the end of 2004, of course, only Auton had completed its journey 
through the Canadian legal system. After a series of victories in British 
Columbia, the province’s “early autism treatment” movement saw its 
fortunes dramatically reversed by the Supreme Court. With Chaoulli 
still an unfinished story at the time of writing, this paper focuses exclu-
sively on Auton. We begin with a brief overview of the legal mobiliza-
tion literature and then turn to the case itself. 
II. LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND POLICY REFORM 
1. Choosing Litigation 
The use of litigation as an instrument of socio-political reform trac-
es its roots to the early 20th century, when the National Consumers’ 
League engaged litigation to advance the interests of working women 
and children in the United States.9 However, credit for the systematic 
development of this type of litigation usually goes to two groups: the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Although both or-
ganizations oriented legal mobilization around a “leading case”  
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approach,10 the NAACP initially took a more programmatic approach 
than did the ACLU. Indeed, the NAACP explicitly developed “a strate-
gic plan for cumulative litigation efforts aimed at achieving specified 
social objectives.”11 
The NAACP turned to litigation because restrictive election laws 
and voting requirements, not to mention poverty and the legacy of slav-
ery, ensured that African-Americans remained a “discrete and insular 
minority,”12 unable to defend or advance their interests through normal 
democratic political participation. Thus, in 1915 the NAACP entered the 
judicial arena to defend the existing legal rights of African Americans, 
and in 1939 it established an independent Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (LDF) to undertake a systematic program of social reform through 
legal mobilization.13 These legal struggles achieved important victories 
against restrictive property covenants and segregated education, and in 
favour of voting rights. The crowning achievement, of course, was the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous declaration in 1954 that segregated 
public education violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion.14 Indeed, Brown has been credited with making judicial activism 
possible,15 and with being “such a moral supernova in civil liberties 
adjudication that it almost single handedly justifies the exercise.”16 To 
be sure, these victories required further legal and political action to 
become even partially effective, but the NAACP’s apparent success 
came to define the method and potential of legal mobilization. 
By the end of the 1960s, based largely on the NAACP’s experience, 
conventional wisdom held that the principal reason for legal mobiliza-
tion was political disadvantage. According to this theory, litigation oc-
curred when groups were systematically blocked from other avenues of 
political change. However, by the middle of the 1970s this conventional 
wisdom was under attack. In perhaps the most widely-cited article in the 
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law and society literature, Marc Galanter argued that only repeat player 
(RP) litigants, with accumulated legal expertise and extensive legal 
resources, were likely to mobilize the law successfully to achieve long 
term programmatic objectives.17 Scholars identified other factors, such 
as diffuse financial support and longevity, as important in making litiga-
tion a feasible strategy.18 It became apparent, in venturing “beyond the 
political disadvantage theory,” that groups without political and eco-
nomic resources were also unlikely to possess the legal resources neces-
sary to sustain systematic litigation campaigns.19 Indeed, even the 
NAACP had political resources in the form of financial support from 
philanthropic organizations and influential, dedicated and hard-working 
individuals with ties to the majority political community.20 These obser-
vations suggested that legal mobilization, which appears superficially to 
be the exclusive province of political outsiders, actually belongs as 
much, and perhaps more, to political insiders.21 
2. Winning Cases 
Whether seeking to press existing advantages, or mobilizing to 
overcome political disadvantage, organized group litigants face several 
strategic and tactical choices. The basic strategic choice is between 
direct sponsorship of test cases and participation as an intervener (or 
amicus curiae, to use American terminology). Direct sponsorship max-
imizes control of litigation but is expensive; intervener participation is 
less costly but provides far less control over the development of legal 
rules. From a strategic point of view, legal mobilization will be more 
successful to the extent that a social movement exercises centralized 
control, brings cases in the proper sequence, and identifies favourable 
venues. The principal tactical decision is to identify “winnable” cases 
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and arguments. The incremental character of judicial policymaking 
means that the ultimate legal objectives of a litigation campaign can best 
be achieved through the gradual development of discrete rules that even-
tually form the basis for a new, over-arching, legal doctrine. In practical 
terms, this means that cases involving the easiest legal questions must 
be identified and litigated first, before moving on to those raising more 
problematic issues. Factual clarity and sympathetic plaintiffs are also 
important factors in winning individual cases. 
3. Policy Impact 
The 1960s ideal of legal mobilization as an instrument for improv-
ing the position of the politically disadvantaged also began to fade as 
scholars questioned whether the achievements of groups like the 
NAACP were more apparent than real. As Stuart Scheingold observed 
in 1974, “two decades after the Brown decision, [Americans] are still 
struggling inconclusively with school desegregation.” According to 
Scheingold, the “continued vitality of litigation,” despite the unfulfilled 
promise of Brown, could “be read as a triumph of myth over reality.”22 
In his view, litigation could produce social reform at best indirectly, by 
contributing to a broader process of political mobilization in which 
interests are activated, organized and realigned.23 Scheingold’s observa-
tions foreshadowed an important debate about legal mobilization be-
tween Gerald Rosenberg and Michael McCann, among others, during 
the 1990s. This debate opened with Rosenberg’s 1991 book, The Hollow 
Hope.24 Rosenberg examined six areas (civil rights, abortion and wom-
en’s rights, environment, reapportionment, and criminal law) and posed 
this question: Did judicial decisions produce significant social reform? 
His findings were pessimistic, and he concluded that systematic institu-
tional factors, including the limited nature of constitutional rights, lim-
ited judicial independence, and limited judicial implementation 
capacity, made legal mobilization an unreliable path to social reform.25 
Despite this pessimism, Rosenberg did recognize some conditions under 
which litigation might be effective. First, incentives must exist for key 
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actors to implement changes. Second, there must be costs associated 
with resisting change. Third, compliance is more likely where the possi-
bility exists that social change can be implemented by parallel institu-
tions. Finally, success will be higher where court orders can be used as 
leverage to extract additional resources.26 
In 1992 Michael McCann described The Hollow Hope as “bold, 
compelling, and important,” yet ultimately unconvincing.27 Although 
McCann raised concerns about evidence, interpretation and conceptual-
ization, he argued that Rosenberg’s approach missed the “constitutive 
capacity of law” in which “legal knowledge prefigures in part the sym-
bolic terms of material relations and becomes a potential resource in 
ongoing struggles to refigure those relations.”28 McCann’s own study of 
legal mobilization and the pay equity movement led him to conclude 
that legal mobilization provides important political payoffs, even in the 
absence of directly positive effects.29 In particular, the mobilization of 
rights discourse by marginalized groups, according to McCann, can be a 
source of empowerment that facilitates long-term improvement in their 
disadvantaged status.30 In response, Rosenberg argued that McCann’s 
“de-centered” approach missed important phenomena — such as union 
activism — that affected the degree of successful legal mobilization in 
the pay equity field.31 According to Rosenberg, a close analysis of 
McCann’s findings actually supported the central thesis of The Hollow 
Hope that “courts can help progressive forces, but only under conditions 
that both occur infrequently and are virtually determinative of change on 
their own.”32 
One of the most important lessons of the McCann-Rosenberg debate 
is that measuring either the success or influence of legal mobilization is 
extremely difficult. Success is not a simple concept, nor is it identical to 
influence. Success can mean favourable outcomes in individual cases, or 
the development of desired legal doctrine. Yet even accomplishing these 
two difficult objectives does not guarantee achieving the broader  
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socio-economic and political changes at which legal mobilization aims. 
Moreover, case outcomes, doctrinal developments, and broader policy 
shifts may be entirely independent of group participation. 
As this overview might suggest, one of the principal deficiencies of 
the legal mobilization literature is that it is based almost exclusively on 
the U.S. experience. American scholars — or at least American political 
scientists — have been notoriously indifferent to the comparative study 
of law, courts, constitutionalism, and judicial behaviour.33 Although this 
indifference has diminished in recent years, it means that the American 
understanding of the role of law and courts in policy development and 
implementation is less rich than it could be. At the same time, scholars 
outside the United States can also be faulted for not paying sufficient 
attention to this phenomenon in their own political systems. For exam-
ple, although scholarly interest in litigation by organized groups in Can-
ada dates back at least 50 years,34 recent studies have focused almost 
exclusively on litigation concerning gender equality and sexual orienta-
tion.35 Moreover, there have been few systematic attempts to examine 
the policy impact of judicial decisions.36 By studying cases like Chaoulli 
and Auton, it is thus possible to contribute to the legal mobilization 
literature in two separate ways. First, by focusing on a non-American 
case, the study leverages the techniques of comparative law to under-
stand better the relationship among litigation, legal rules and social 
policy. Second, by locating these case studies within a well-established 
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non-Canadian literature, the study extends knowledge of two vital, yet 
under-studied, phenomena in Canadian policy studies. 
III. LITIGATING AUTISM TREATMENT REFORM 
The Auton case entered the judicial process with a single litigation 
objective: to obtain a remedial order of mandamus requiring British 
Columbia to fund Lovaas Autism Treatment as a medically necessary 
service within its public health care system. In view of this objective, we 
adopt as a framework for analysis Phillip Cooper’s model of remedial 
decree litigation, which consists of trigger, liability, remedy, and post-
decree phases.37 The trigger phase of remedial decree litigation includes 
both the general historical practices and specific triggering events that 
lead to the initiation of a case. The liability and remedy phases, in which 
rights violations are determined and remedies formulated to correct the 
violations, constitute the central components of remedial decree litiga-
tion. These phases may occur either simultaneously or as the subject of 
separate proceedings. The final step in remedial decree litigation is the 
post-decree phase, during which remedies are implemented, evaluated 
and refined. This phase is characterized by interaction between litigants 
and judges, with the degree of judicial involvement related to the extent 
of the constitutional violation, the organizational capacity for change, 
and the surrounding political culture. With this model providing our 
framework, we explore three key questions: How did this issue get into 
the legal process? Why did the claim succeed in lower courts? Why did 
it fail so dramatically in the Supreme Court? 
1. Triggering Litigation 
In 1987, Dr. O. Ivar Lovass published the results of a study measur-
ing the effects of a particular form of “early intensive behavioral inter-
vention” (EIBI) for the treatment of autism.38 The study reported that 17 
of 19 children who received an average of 40 hours per week of intensive 
individual therapeutic treatment demonstrated significant improvements 
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in their social and communication skills. Moreover, nine of the children 
successfully completed first grade in regular classes and were no differ-
ent from their peers with respect to IQ, adaptive skills, and emotional 
functioning. Six years later, Lovaas and two colleagues conducted a 
follow-up study, which suggested that the earlier treatment gains had 
been maintained and that eight of nine children were continuing to pro-
gress in regular classes without special support.39  
Because of the treatment’s apparent success, intensity (40 hours per 
week over two to three years), and cost (approximately $50,000 annual-
ly), the Lovaas studies triggered the establishment of a continent-wide 
movement to secure private and public funding for EIBI that became 
known as Families for Early (or, in some cases, “Effective”) Autism 
Treatment (FEAT). Established in 1993 in northern California, the 
FEAT movement quickly spread across the United States and Canada. 
After engaging in individual advocacy for government funding of LAT 
for a year, Dr. Sabrina Freeman, a sociologist with an autistic daughter, 
founded a branch of FEAT in British Columbia in 1996 and became its 
executive director. Starting from the proposition that Lovaas Autism 
Treatment (LAT) “is an effective, scientifically supported treatment for 
young children with the neurological disorder of autism,” FEAT BC’s 
position from the outset was that the B.C. government’s refusal to rec-
ognize LAT as a medically necessary service provided through the prov-
ince’s health care system contravened “several laws designed to protect 
the rights of the disabled.” 
Litigation was thus at the forefront of FEAT BC’s campaign to 
change the government’s policy toward LAT. Asserting that the “gov-
ernment of B.C. must recognize its legal obligation and financially sup-
port early, intensive and scientifically proven autism treatment for every 
child diagnosed with this condition,” it explicitly invited lawyers “who 
want to change the discriminatory health care system in Canada” to 
contact the organization. Referring to litigation in the United States, 
FEAT BC stressed that “the force of law must also be brought to bear in 
Canada.”40 Most relevantly, in August of 1996 a decision by the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench held that “Lovaas-type programs” constituted a 
service for handicapped children within the meaning of the province’s 
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Child Welfare Act and ordered the director of child welfare services to 
fund 90 per cent of the therapy’s cost.41  
FEAT BC secured strong legal representation from Christopher 
Hinkson, a partner in the Vancouver law firm of Harper, Grey, Easton. 
Founded in 1907, Harper, Grey, Easton is a relatively small (approxi-
mately 50 lawyers) firm specializing in civil litigation. Designated as 
one of the leading 500 lawyers in Canada by Lexpert, Hinkson’s prac-
tice includes medical malpractice, personal injury litigation, profession-
al negligence, insurance, products liability and administrative law. From 
1987 to 1995 he served as Vice Chairman/Director of the B.C. Medical 
Services Foundation. He is, in short, a highly experienced litigator with 
particular expertise in medical and health care issues, backed by a dis-
tinguished firm. 
On March 30, 1998 FEAT BC issued a press release entitled “Mal-
practice in the B.C. Government,” which criticized the government for 
refusing to fund the “one effective treatment” for autism. On July 30, 
1998 a number of families received a joint letter from the deputy minis-
ters of Education and Children and Families, informing them that the 
government was not “in a resource position” to fund LAT.42 Two weeks 
later, Connor Auton and his mother Michelle started class action pro-
ceedings on behalf of all children and their families who had been de-
nied funding for LAT by the provincial government. Although the 
courts refused to certify the proceedings as a class action, the pleadings 
were amended to include three additional children and their parents, 
including Sabrina Freeman and her daughter Michelle Tamir. The peti-
tioners sought a declaration from the court that the denial of funding for 
LAT contravened their constitutional rights under sections 7 and 15(1) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,43 and also sought an 
order of mandamus requiring that the government compensate them for 
the costs of LAT already incurred and for the future costs of treatment. 
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Both parties agreed, however, that the liability and remedy issues could 
be dealt with in separate proceedings. 
2. Liability Proceedings 
The liability phase of proceedings consisted of a 10-day trial before 
Marion Allan J. of the B.C. Supreme Court in April, 2000. The principal 
point of factual disagreement between the parties concerned the clinical 
effectiveness of LAT, which was the key issue underlying the legal 
claim that it should be considered “medically necessary.” The petition-
ers built their case in favour of LAT in two stages. Since all four chil-
dren had received LAT at their parents’ expense, the first stage was to 
demonstrate that the treatment had made a difference in these specific 
cases. Although the government challenged the admissibility of physi-
cians’ letters as evidence of progress under LAT, it did not dispute the 
parents’ own affidavits concerning improvements in behaviour and 
communication skills. Consequently, Allan J. declared that she was 
“satisfied on the basis of admissible evidence that the infant petitioners 
made significant gains as a result of the Lovaas Autism Treatment they 
received.”44 The petitioners’ claims, of course, went further than this. 
They contended that their children’s experience simply affirmed the 
results of the 1987 and 1993 studies, indicating that LAT “is a medically 
necessary service insofar as it significantly improves the condition of 
these children.”45 
While not vigorously disputing the claim of positive outcomes in 
these specific cases, the government did question the general scientific 
validity of the two Lovaas studies. The government argued that two 
methodological flaws seriously undermined the Lovaas studies: the 
absence of random assignment into experimental and control groups and 
the failure to replicate the study.46 In the government’s view, these flaws 
made it impossible to derive any general conclusions about the effec-
tiveness of LAT from these studies. At best, it argued, the treatment 
could be considered experimental. In support of this position, the gov-
ernment commissioned a study by the Office of Health Technology 
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Assessment Services and Policy Research at the University of British 
Columbia. The study concluded that, “while many forms of intensive 
behavioural therapy clearly benefit children with autism, there is insuf-
ficient, scientifically-valid effectiveness evidence to establish a causal 
relationship between a particular program of intensive, behavioural 
treatment, and the achievement of ‘normal functioning’.” The study 
based this conclusion on two findings: (1) the existence of only one 
published report of a controlled clinical trial the results of which the 
scientific community was reluctant to accept; and (2) lack of corrobora-
tion by independent researchers. The report advised that “randomized 
trials of alternative early intensive treatment programs are ethical and 
feasible,” and that such research “is required before effectiveness claims 
can form the basis of public funding decisions regarding alternative 
program options.”47 
Justice Allan was, to say the least, unimpressed by the report.48 She 
suggested that its authors had misled the court about whether the report 
had been subjected to external peer review before being filed as an ex-
hibit in the proceedings; she criticized the research team for not consult-
ing health professionals supportive of LAT and for relying on a “single 
anecdotal comment” for a key finding; and she criticized the report for 
falsely asserting that Dr. Lovaas and his colleagues had claimed that 
LAT “cures” autism. In her view, the report added “little or nothing” to 
existing debates about the 1987 and 1993 studies and exhibited such “an 
obvious bias” towards the government’s position as to detract “signifi-
cantly from its usefulness.” The only part of the report that she found 
valuable was its acknowledgment that “early intervention with behav-
ioural treatment can help to alleviate autistic symptoms in many if not 
most autistic children.” Indeed, the expert witness testimony for both 
parties led her to conclude that there “are no effective competing treat-
ments” for “those based on principles of ABA.”49 Moreover, she deter-
mined that “early intensive behavioural treatment” should be considered 
a “medically necessary service” under the terms of both provincial and 
federal legislation.50 She reached this conclusion by broadly defining a 
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“medically necessary” service as “whatever cures or ameliorates ill-
ness.”51 
Having made this determination, and finding that British Columbia 
was not providing such treatment, Allan J. turned her attention to 
whether this failure violated constitutionally guaranteed equality rights. 
Two prior Supreme Court of Canada decisions set the parameters of her 
discussion. First, in 1997 the Court had held in Eldridge v. British Co-
lumbia that British Columbia’s failure to provide a comprehensive sys-
tem of publicly funded sign language interpretation for deaf patients 
denied those patients equal benefit of the law by limiting their ability to 
communicate effectively with health care practitioners.52 Second, in 
1999 the Court had consolidated 10 years of jurisprudence to set con-
trolling principles for the application of equality rights.53 According to 
Law v. Canada, the purpose of section 15(1) is “to prevent the violation 
of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of dis-
advantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote 
a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human 
beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally 
deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”54  
From Eldridge, Allan J. determined that, “having created a universal 
medicare system of health benefits, the government is prohibited from 
conferring those benefits in a discriminatory manner.” From Law, she 
concluded that, by “failing to make appropriate accommodation for their 
health care needs” on the premise “that one cannot effectively treat 
autistic children,” the government was discriminating against such chil-
dren by perpetuating a “misconceived stereotype.”55 She rejected the 
government’s claim that its decision was justified by — in fact, based 
on — a rational allocation of finite health care resources. Nevertheless, 
although she concluded that “the appropriate treatment is ABA or early 
intensive behavioural intervention” and that British Columbia “discrim-
inates against the petitioners contrary to s. 15(1) by failing to accommo-
date their disadvantaged position by providing effective treatment for 
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autism,”56 Allan J. agreed with the province that she did not have juris-
diction to make a specific order requiring the province to provide LAT. 
Instead, she invited counsel for both parties to make additional submis-
sions on the precise nature of an appropriate remedy for the constitu-
tional violation. 
Although favourable to FEAT BC, the trial court’s liability finding 
was not without difficulty. First, the court arguably focused on the 
wrong principle of the Canada Health Act when it defined the issue in 
terms of universality.57 This principle is usually understood as requiring 
that all qualified provincial residents must receive insured services, not 
that all possible medical treatments be insured. Debates about the ap-
propriate scope of insured services instead fall under the principle of 
comprehensiveness. Second, in broadening the definition of “medically 
necessary” the court departed from the Canada Health Act’s definition 
as encompassing services delivered in hospitals or by physicians.58 
Moreover, the court may have misinterpreted expert testimony in order 
to reach this broad definition. According to Allan J., the expert (Dr. 
Morris Barer) defined “medical treatment” as “whatever cures or ame-
liorates illness.”59 It is unclear, however, whether Dr. Barer considered 
“medical treatment” and “medically necessary service” as interchangea-
ble terms. 
3. Remedy Phase 
The remedy proceedings took place in November 2000, and Allan J. 
rendered her judgment in February 2001.60 Part of these proceedings 
concerned the province’s initial efforts to comply with the liability rul-
ing. Specifically, it had established the Provincial Centre for Autism and 
Related Disorders (P-CARD) to provide province-wide services, includ-
ing EIBI, for at least 20 hours per week to all diagnosed autistic children 
less than six years of age by 2003. The petitioners objected to this pro-
gram because of its age restrictions, limited number of treatment hours, 
                                                                                                                                
56  Id., at para. 156. 
57  Donna Greschner & Stephen Lewis, “Auton and Evidence-Based Decision Making: 
Medicare in the Courts” (2003) 82 Can. Bar Rev. 501, at 514. 
58  Id., at 515. 
59  Auton No. 1, supra, note 42, at para. 102. 
60  Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Minister of Health), [2001] B.C.J. 
No. 215, 84 B.C.L.R. (3d) 259 (S.C.) [hereinafter “Auton No. 2”]. 
126  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
and failure to include LAT. Justice Allan approached these objections 
cautiously, noting that the case “raises significant public policy issues as 
to the respective roles of the judiciary and the legislature.” “The issues 
raised by the petitioners,” she continued, “underscore the difficulties 
inherent in a process where the Court’s finding of unconstitutionality is 
designed to change governmental behaviour.” Recognizing the im-
portance of judicial review, Allan J. nevertheless held that “the judiciary 
cannot dictate what treatment programmes should or should not be im-
plemented, nor can it dictate how limited financial resources should be 
allocated.” She was unwilling to characterize the government’s compli-
ance efforts as reluctant, negative or intransigent.61 In her view, it was 
too early to judge the efficacy of the P-CARD program, and therefore 
premature “to make an order of mandamus.”62 The result was a three-
part remedy declaring a denial of equality rights, directing the Crown to 
fund early intensive behavioural therapy for children with autism, and 
awarding the adult petitioners in the case $20,000 in monetary damages. 
4. Postdecree Phase 
From Allan J.’s courtroom, the case moved to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal, where the government appealed the liability declara-
tion and the petitioners cross-appealed on the treatment and damages 
issues.63 The appellate court unanimously rejected the government’s 
appeal, holding that “the failure of the health care administrators of the 
Province to consider the individual needs of the infant complainants by 
funding treatment is a statement that their mental disability is less wor-
thy of assistance than the transitory medical problems of others” and 
signaled that “the community was less interested in their plight than the 
plight of other children needing medical care and adults needing mental 
health therapy.”64 The court also rejected the petitioners’ cross-appeal 
against Allan J.’s decision not to require funding for LAT specifically, 
agreeing with her conclusion that it was not the only effective form of 
EIBI that autistic children could receive.65 It similarly rejected their 
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cross-appeal against her refusal to require treatment beyond the age of 
six. Although accepting “that the efficacy of treatment is unlikely to end 
at the crisp attainment of school age,” the appellate court held that “is-
sues of funding programs for children of school age may involve addi-
tional considerations not before the Court, either in evidence or 
submissions.”66 However, the court did direct that disputes about the 
duration of treatment be decided on a case-by-case basis in an appropri-
ate dispute resolution process or in trial court proceedings, thus in prin-
ciple expanding Allan J.’s remedy to include children over the age of 
six. The cross-appeal was successful with respect to the specific chil-
dren involved in the original proceedings. Although the court was un-
willing to impose a general policy on LAT or duration of treatment, it 
found that the children named in the original complaint were “entitled to 
government funded treatment in the nature of that which they have been 
receiving…to continue until the medical view is that no further signifi-
cant benefit in alleviating the autistic condition can reasonably be ex-
pected from a continuation of the treatment.”67 
The province reacted to its appellate court loss in two ways. Most 
obviously, it applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which the 
Court granted on May 15, 2003. Less obviously, it sought to restrict the 
appellate court’s ruling to the four children named as parties. Not sur-
prisingly, 23 families who had been part of the original class action 
application, and who had remained background participants in the Auton 
litigation, objected to the province’s action. They filed a petition in the 
British Columbia Supreme Court claiming the same remedy as the 
named Auton litigants, including monetary damages.68 With the excep-
tion of monetary damages, the court agreed with these families and held 
that they, too, should receive government funded LAT until such time as 
it was no longer medically beneficial. 
On June 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada heard oral argu-
ments in Auton. The case’s broad importance was evident in the fact that 
it attracted 19 interveners, including 10 governments (Canada, New 
Brunswick, Manitoba, Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, New-
foundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia), eight 
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organizations (Canadian Association for Community Living, Council of 
Canadians With Disabilities, Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund, DisAbled Women’s Network, Autism Society Canada, Families 
for Effective Autism Treatment of Alberta Foundation, Friends of Chil-
dren with Autism, Families for Early Autism Treatment of Ontario), and 
one individual. Not surprisingly, the governments were all concerned 
about the case’s implications for their capacity to set health care funding 
priorities. By contrast, the non-governmental organization interveners 
all urged the Court to uphold the lower court judgments. Interestingly, 
the individual intervener — Michelle Dawson, an adult autistic woman 
— urged the Court to reverse the earlier judgments on the grounds that 
those decisions, rather than the province’s refusal to fund LAT, perpetu-
ated a stereotype that autistic individuals are incapable of living ful-
filling lives and are doomed to institutionalization. 
The submissions on behalf of the Auton group sought to preserve 
the equality rights liability ruling and to expand the province’s liability 
to encompass section 7 of the Charter. The factum thus argued that 
British Columbia was liable for the entire cost of providing LAT to the 
children named in the lower court proceedings. Consequently, the fami-
lies asked the Court to order reimbursement of their LAT expenses from 
the date they were first incurred instead of from the date of the initial 
declaration of a Charter violation. For the families, therefore, the Su-
preme Court proceedings were less about public policy than about com-
pensation for expenses incurred in securing therapy for their children 
which had been unconstitutionally denied them by the provincial gov-
ernment. This was apparent in oral argument, where Christopher 
Hinkson tried to focus the justices’ attention on a specific instance of 
intransigent behaviour by government officials rather than on the broad-
er implications of the litigation. Hinkson denied that he was asking the 
Court to substitute its health policy preferences for those of the prov-
ince. All the families were demanding, he argued, was that bureaucratic 
funding decisions be transparent and non-arbitrary. For British Colum-
bia, by contrast, the issues before the Court were very much about pub-
lic policy. Indeed, British Columbia argued that the lower court 
judgments would “distort the process” of health care funding decisions 
by creating “a category of constitutionally mandated medical services.”69 
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In oral argument the province submitted that decisions about refusing, 
delaying, or rationing services were polycentric decisions within the 
general discretion of government. 
The Court delivered its judgment in Auton on November 19, 2004.70 
The unanimous decision, delivered by the Chief Justice, was a stunning 
legal defeat for FEAT BC. The Court reversed both lower court deci-
sions, dismissed the petitioners’ cross-appeal, and held unconditionally 
that British Columbia’s refusal to fund LAT did not constitute discrimi-
nation under section 15. Although expressing sympathy for the petition-
ers and the lower court decisions in their favour, McLachlin C.J. was 
clear that the issue before the Court was not “what the public health 
system should provide,” but whether “failure to fund” certain services 
under that system can be “an unequal and discriminatory denial of bene-
fits.”71 She drew a clear distinction, in other words, between decisions 
about what is included in the health care “basket” (“a matter for Parlia-
ment and the legislature”) and the delivery of services authorized by law 
(to be done “in a non-discriminatory manner”). 
Four considerations — two factual and two legal — drove the Chief 
Justice’s judgment. One factual consideration, referred to by the Chief 
Justice at three points in her judgment, was the “controversial” or 
“emergent” nature of the autism treatment under consideration.72 Indeed, 
she referred explicitly to Michelle Dawson’s intervention against the 
therapy, and cited specific objections to it such as “its reliance in its 
early years on crude and arguably painful stimuli” and “its goal of 
changing the child’s mind and personality.”73 The second factual con-
sideration was the existence of some government funded programs for 
autistic children and their families.74 “At the time of trial,” she noted, 
“the government funded a number of programs for young autistic chil-
dren, and appeared to be moving toward funding some form of early 
intervention therapy.”75 Although the Chief Justice suggested that, in 
retrospect, the government should have moved more quickly, she con-
cluded that “it is difficult to say that the government in purpose or effect 
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put autistic children and their families ‘on the back burner’.”76 By focus-
ing on these facts — rather than on the tragic impact of autism, bureau-
cratic intransigence, personal economic sacrifice, or individual progress 
under LAT — the Chief Justice provided a relatively benign picture of 
the pre-Auton policy status quo. 
However, it was in her legal analysis of the claim that the Chief Jus-
tice dealt her harshest blow to the claimants. In her view, their claim 
simply did not involve a benefit provided by law; moreover, even if it 
did, there was no discrimination in the decision not to fund LAT. On the 
first point, the Chief Justice concluded that nothing in the legislative 
framework of public health care “provides anyone with all medically 
required treatment.”77 In her view, the legal benefit conferred by this 
framework was restricted to “core” medical services, which did not 
include EIBI therapy under either federal or provincial law. Although 
provinces have discretion to extend public funding to “non-core” ser-
vices, she continued, there is no constitutional obligation to do so either 
generally or for specific services. A government, she stressed, is “under 
no obligation to create a particular benefit,” but is “free to target the 
social programs it wishes to fund as a matter of public policy, provided 
the benefit itself is not conferred in a discriminatory manner.”78 From 
this perspective, EIBI autism therapy was simply outside the range of 
health services to which the claimants had a legal right — whether by 
statute or Constitution. There could not, therefore, be any violation of 
section 15(1) in a decision not to fund LAT. 
Although the Chief Justice could have ended her inquiry there, she 
nevertheless considered whether there was any basis to the claim of 
discrimination in this case. On this point, she defined the comparator 
group in such narrow terms as to make a finding of discrimination virtu-
ally impossible. She rejected the suggestion that autistic children should 
be compared to non-disabled children or to adults with a mental ill-
ness.79 Instead, she argued that the “appropriate comparator” is “a non-
disabled person or a person suffering a disability other than a mental 
disability (here autism) seeking or receiving funding for a non-core 
therapy important for his or her present and future health, which is 
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emergent and only recently becoming recognized as medically re-
quired.”80 The lower courts had erred, in other words, in comparing the 
claim for an “emergent” non-core therapy to funding for established 
therapies.81 Discrimination could only exist, she concluded, if the prov-
ince had acted more quickly in funding equally emergent non-core ther-
apies for non-disabled or physically (rather than mentally) disabled 
persons. Not only was there no evidence of such action, according to the 
Chief Justice, but the government’s conduct, “considered in the context 
of the emergent nature of ABA/IBI therapy…raises doubts about 
whether there was a real denial or differential treatment of autistic chil-
dren.”82 
Despite her vindication of British Columbia’s position, the Chief 
Justice did not let its actions escape criticism altogether. She described 
the decision to transfer jurisdiction over child and youth mental health 
from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Children and Families as 
“inauspicious.”83 She also concurred with the trial court’s finding that 
the government’s actions “did not meet the ‘gold standard of scientific 
methodology’.”84 Nevertheless, she concluded that “there is no evidence 
suggesting that the government’s approach to ABA/IBI therapy was 
different than its approach to other comparable, novel therapies for non-
disabled persons or persons with a different type of disability.”85 What-
ever the weaknesses of the government’s decision making process, they 
were not constitutional deficiencies. 
5. Analysis 
The emergence of a rights-based argument for public funding of 
Lovaas Autism Treatment in British Columbia was planned and strate-
gic rather than accidental. FEAT BC was connected to an organizational 
network dedicated to ensuring accessibility to LAT through legal action. 
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Its website referred readers to more than 20 U.S. and Canadian judg-
ments — based primarily on statutes and administrative law — impos-
ing obligations on public authorities to fund LAT. It proactively sought 
legal counsel to pursue its claim in court, and secured the participation 
of a highly qualified lawyer with specialized expertise in health-related 
litigation. FEAT BC’s contribution to the movement was to raise the 
stakes beyond other Canadian autism litigation by framing its argument 
as a Charter claim. In this sense, Auton was not simply about getting 
access to a service, but about entrenching that service in such a way as 
to immunize it from shifting policy preferences or scientific evidence. 
Among the factors accounting for the case’s initial success were sympa-
thetic plaintiffs (autistic children and their struggling parents), good 
facts (evidence of family sacrifice and individual progress under the 
therapy), and a favourable venue (B.C. courts had established a track 
record of intervening in health care policy). These factors came together 
to link a broad definition of “medically necessary treatment” to funda-
mental statutory (universality) and constitutional (equality) principles. 
Why were these factors ineffective in the Supreme Court of Cana-
da? One answer, as discussed above, lies in the Chief Justice’s alterna-
tive factual framing. She chose to emphasize the controversial and 
emergent nature of LAT, as well as the province’s good faith (even if 
imperfect) efforts to provide EIBI to progressively larger numbers of 
autistic children. A second answer lies in her understanding of Eldridge, 
which differed from the trial court’s understanding. According to the 
Chief Justice, Eldridge “did not assist the petitioners” because it con-
cerned unequal access to a benefit already provided by law while their 
claim was for “access to a benefit that the law has not conferred.”86 
Finally, although not cited in her judgment, the relevance of the Court’s 
2002 decision in Gosselin v. Quebec should not be underestimated.87 In 
Gosselin a majority of the Court, led by the Chief Justice, held that a 
differential welfare regime for young adults (under 30) did not violate 
the Charter’s equality rights. As the Chief Justice noted then, the issues 
raised by that case had “implications for the range of options available 
to governments throughout Canada in targeting welfare programs to 
address the particular needs and circumstances of individuals requiring 
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social assistance.”88 Her judgment, easily transferable to other social 
programs, was that this range of options should not be unduly narrowed. 
Although narrowly decided, Gosselin was a good indicator of the Chief 
Justice’s thinking on the issue. 
The Auton case offers an important glimpse into both the promise 
and limitations of legal mobilization. Its ultimate resolution in the Su-
preme Court suggests the most obvious limitation: legal mobilization 
can fail to establish the desired legal rule. Certainly, the Court’s unani-
mous rejection of the lower court rulings in Auton was an unambiguous 
reversal of legal fortunes for the LAT movement. Yet, even when the 
case was legally successful, it provided FEAT BC with mixed results. 
On the positive side, two courts recognized a constitutional right to 
government-funded EIBI treatment for autism, awarded monetary dam-
ages to four families, and granted compensation for incurred expenses 
and future autism treatment of their choice to 27 families. The decisions 
also led British Columbia to convert a small pilot program of treatment 
into full-fledged government policy, even as it appealed its legal losses. 
Finally, the victories supported legal mobilization outside B.C. as FEAT 
branches in other provinces, notably Ontario, began leveraging the B.C. 
judgments to press for extended EIBI funding. Indeed, 11 autism fund-
ing cases were decided in various provinces in 2003 and 2004.89 On the 
negative side, FEAT BC never achieved its objective of obtaining a 
legal declaration that LAT is the only effective treatment for autism. 
Consistent with Rosenberg’s observations, the B.C. courts were reluc-
tant to exercise their full remedial authority in a social policy field out-
side their traditional area of expertise in legal procedure. The legal 
victories never provided the LAT movement with its ultimate goal. 
 Nor, however, did the Supreme Court defeat, as disappointing 
and deflating as it must have been, remove all of the energy from the 
movement. Governments still face significant, and potentially successful, 
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autism litigation. According to the Autism Society of Canada, there 
were more than 180 other cases, involving over 1,600 families, still 
pending in November, 2004.90 Moreover, in January, 2005 the Ontario 
Superior Court granted an interlocutory injunction against the province, 
requiring it to continue funding EIBI treatment for two six-year-old 
boys despite the Auton ruling.91 The court distinguished the two cases on 
the grounds that Ontario provided funding through its Ministry of 
Community and Social Services rather than through the Ontario Hospi-
tal Insurance Plan. As such, the boys were being denied a benefit pro-
vided by law on the basis of age. Finding that the boys would suffer 
“irreparable harm” if withdrawn from treatment, the court held that it 
would be discriminatory to do so. In this sense, Auton may have simply 
shifted the focus of legal mobilization efforts from one constitutional 
arena to another. 
Equally, and perhaps more importantly, the legal defeat may have 
favourably mobilized public opinion. Editorial reaction to the decision 
was generally to the effect that governments should fund the treatment 
whether constitutionally required to or not.92 Even the National Post — 
an outlet not generally known for its support of government spending, 
publicly-funded health care, or judicial activism — criticized provincial 
governments for not funding LAT and for undertaking costly court 
battles to avoid any obligation to do so.93 An Ipsos-Reid poll reported in 
December, 2004 that 84 per cent of Canadians supported public funding 
for EIBI despite the Court’s decision,94 and two MPs (Scott Reid (Con) 
and Tony Martin (NDP)) tabled petitions in Parliament supporting fund-
ing for EIBI. As McCann might argue, the six-year litigation campaign 
for autism funding brought the issue to public attention and shifted the 
policy advantage toward the movement behind it. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Auton story, at least as briefly rendered here, is in many ways 
consistent with both sides of the debate concerning legal mobilization. 
Although litigation ultimately failed to establish the sought-for legal 
rule, it nevertheless nudged public policy in the desired direction and 
strengthened the autism treatment reform movement by energizing its 
participants and raising public visibility. Consistent with McCann’s 
position, the litigation effort succeeded in using legal arguments to re-
constitute the policy debate about effective autism treatment. Moreover, 
the nature of the claimants meant that the effort did not generate a coun-
termovement similar to what scholars have found in the case of abortion 
and gay rights litigation.95 Nevertheless, Auton is also consistent with 
aspects of Rosenberg’s argument. Although there was no organized 
countermovement, the lower court successes generated an article by two 
highly respected scholars — Donna Greschner and Stephen Lewis — 
that was highly critical of those lower court decisions. In addition, those 
successes opened the door to Michelle Dawson’s intervention, which 
raised doubts about the universal acceptance of LAT as an appropriate 
treatment for autism. Institutionally, limited judicial independence and 
implementation capacity manifested itself in the form of remedial cau-
tion in the British Columbia courts, which meant that even legal victo-
ries did not translate directly into optimal policy change. Finally, the 
decision to invest six years and significant resources in a litigation cam-
paign obviously entailed opportunity costs, the magnitude of which is 
difficult to measure. 
What are the broader implications of litigating health care reform? 
In the specific case of autism treatment, the combination of Auton and 
the Ontario decisions suggest a number of possible consequences, none 
of which are intended or desirable. First, given that there is no constitu-
tional obligation to fund ABA or EIBI, but that there may be a constitu-
tional obligation to fund treatment indefinitely once programs are in 
place, current autism litigation may have a chilling effect on provincial 
innovation. Second, the current state of the law in Ontario may provide an 
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incentive for parents whose children have any kind of learning difficulty 
to encourage autism diagnoses in order to access these programs. Final-
ly, as increased demand meets the reality of finite resources — in the 
form of money and qualified therapists — treatment waiting lists will 
lengthen. In each of these scenarios, the provincial response will un-
doubtedly generate even more litigation. 
More generally, both Chaoulli and Auton are products of frustration 
with the inability of apparently unresponsive health care decision mak-
ers to provide a desired level of service. Although the desire of Canadi-
ans, frustrated by perceived bureaucratic and legislative inaction, to seek 
health care solutions from the courts is understandable, the benefits and 
costs of this path to policy change merit closer attention. The obvious 
benefit is that, when litigation is successful, courts may be able to order 
governments to act quickly and forcefully. Yet litigation is not without 
disadvantages. First, the articulation of policy demands in the form of 
constitutional rights can exclude alternative policy choices from consid-
eration. Rights-based litigation aims at altering policy priorities in an 
especially powerful way because of the difficulty of reversing, or even 
modifying, the priorities set through it. In this sense, health care litiga-
tion may, in some circumstances, be understood as a sophisticated form 
of queue jumping because it posits that a particular health care need 
deserves a higher priority than it has because of its grounding in a con-
stitutional right. Second, the adversarial nature of litigation is best suited 
to resolving concrete disputes between two parties by imposing retro-
spective remedies. Complex policy issues — like health care — involve 
multiple stakeholders, constantly changing facts and evidence, and pre-
dictive assessments about the future impact of decisions. Finally, rights-
based litigation, particularly at the Supreme Court level, by definition 
imposes national solutions on inherently local problems. These solutions 
can ignore differences among provinces and suppress the provincial 
experimentation necessary to find innovative approaches to policy prob-
lems. Canadian health care faces a multitude of complex challenges, 
which requires careful consideration of the contribution that courts can 
make in meeting those challenges before embracing litigation as an 
instrument of reform in health care policy. 
 
